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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-]URIsmcrIoNAL AUTHORITY OF

THE

PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT REVIEW BOARD

INTRODUcrION
The Medicare Act was enacted in 1965 to provide a health insur
ance program to assure health care to Social Security recipients over
sixty-five years of age and to those permanently disabled. l One major
section of the Medicare Act, Part A, governs payment for inpatient
hospitalization and medical care for the elderly and disabled. 2 Under
the statute, the federal government reimburses providers of medical
services3 for the care rendered to patients,4 subject to certain guide
1. The Medicare Act is embodied in Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 139S-139Sxx (1982). H. McCoRMICK, MEDICARE & MEDICAID CLAIMS &
PROCEDURE viii (2d ed. 1986).
In 1984, the Medicare program provided hospital and medical insurance protection
for 30.5 million persons. The benefits paid through the program have increased from $4.5
billion in 1967 to $63 billion in 1984. PuBLIC REL. DIY. HEALTH INs. Ass'N OF AM.,
SOURCE BooK OF HEALTH INS. 1986 UPDATE 16 (1986).
2. H. McCoRMICK, supra note I, at viii. This part of the Medicare Act is financed
through payroll deductions.
Part A includes 42 U.S.C. §§ 139Sc-139Si (1982). Part B covers voluntary insurance
for supplemental medical benefits. It includes 42 U.S.C. §§ 139Sj-139Sw (1982). Part C
includes miscellaneous provisions applicable to Parts A and B. This section includes 42
U.S.C. §§ 139Sx·139Sxx (1982). Tallahassee Memorial Medical Center v. Bowen, 815 F.2d
1435, 1438 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988). See also H. McCoR
MICK, supra note I, at viii.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sx(u) (1982) states: ''The term 'provider of services' means a hos
pital, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility or home
health agency, [or] hospice program...." In the reported cases discussed in this comment,
the providers were hospitals. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE PRO
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lines and limitations. The Medicare Act sets forth general costs al
lowed for reimbursement and a~thorizes the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations
and policies that further define and interpret those costs. 5
The Secretary employs fiscal intermediaries as agents to assist in
the administration of the program. 6 Intermediaries are responsible for
assisting providers in recording and reporting program costs and, sub
ject to regulations ~md policies promulgated by the Secretary, deter
mining what costs are allowable and then distributing funds to the
providers to cover those costs.
In 1972, Congress created a Provider Reimbursement Review
Board (Board) to settle cost disputes between fiscal intermediaries and
providers of services. 7 Although Congress gave the Board broad re
viewing authority,S the Board has declined to hear a certain class of
appeals. If providers have not initially presented their claims for reim
bursement of particular costs to fiscal intermediaries, the Board states
that it lacks statutory power to exercise jurisdiction over the appeals
and dismisses them. 9 This denial of jurisdiction is critical; it not only
affects the providers' access to judicial review of the particular inter
mediary decision, but, more importantly, it forecloses judicial review
of the Secretary's regulations governing an entire class of costs. If the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeals, then the federal courts also
lack jurisdiction. 10
Providers have challenged the Board's dismissals of their appeals,
and the United States Courts of Appeals have developed five different
VIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL 2900A(I) (1987). The manual contains policy provi
sions promulgated by the Secretary to assist providers in comprehending the agency's
regulations.
4. Persons covered under Part A include:
all individuals aged 65 or over who are eligible for any type of OASDI (Old Age
Survivors and Disability Insurance) ... and all disabled beneficiaries (workers
under age 65, widows and widowers aged 50-64 and children aged 18 and over
disabled before age 22) who have been on the benefit roll for at least 2 years.
H. MCCORMICK, supra note I, at 9.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1982). An intermediary can be a "national, state ... public
or private agency or organization." Id. "The Health Care Finance Administration has
selected about 64 intermediaries. . .. Of these organizations, the Blue Cross Association
represents the greatest number of hospitals through its nomination by the American Hospi
tal Association." H. MCCoRMICK, supra note I, at 21.
7. The jurisdiction and authority of the Board is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a)
and (d). For the text of these subsections, see infra note 29 and text accompanying note 30.
8. See infra note 29 accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
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approaches to evaluate the propriety of the Board's decisions. II The
United States Supreme Court in Bethesda Hospital Association v. Sec
retary of Health and Human S~rvices 12 attempted to resolve the con
troversy among the federal circuit courts of appeals by constructing
the proper interpretation of the Board's reviewing authority,l3 How
ever, the Court developed an approach which unduly expands the
Board's reviewing authority and raises several policy concerns.
This comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Bethesda
and explores the five competing interpr~tations of the Board's review
ing authority which the federal courts of appeals developed prior to
Bethesda. Part I of this comment discusses the reimbursement and
appeal procedures of Part A of the Medicare program. Part II dis
cusses the case law construing the Board's jurisdiction. It discusses
separately the cases that affirm the Board's lack of jurisdiction, those
that hold that the Board has discretion to determine whether and
when it has jurisdiction, and those that hold that the Board has and
must assert jurisdiction. 14 Part III reviews the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation in Bethesda of the Board's governing statute.
Part IV offers a critique of the Supreme Court's approach in Bethesda
and argues that the Court should have endorsed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' interpretation in Adams House Health Care v.
Bowen. In Adams House,ls the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Board has jurisdiction over claims where the providers chal
lenge a regulation or policy provision, and affirmed the Board's lack of
jurisdiction in situations where the provider has simply failed to sub
mit the required cost information to the intermediary.16 This pre
ferred approach is consistent with the language of the statute, its
legislative history, and the strong policy favoring judicial review of
administrative action.
11. These approaches are discussed in further detail later in this comment. See infra
notes 42-129 and accompanying text.
12. 108 S. Ct. 1255 (1988).
13. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435 (11th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988). The following cases have been vacated and
remanded to the United States Courts of Appeals for further consideration in light of
Bethesda: Adams House Health Care v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and
remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988); University of Cincinnati v. Heckler, 809 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988); North Broward Hosp. Dist. v.
Bowen, 808 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988).
14. See infra notes 41-129 and accompanying text.
15. 817 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE REIMBURSEMENT AND
ApPEAL PROCEDURES

The Medicare Act provides a comprehensive system of reim
bursement and an administrative appeals process for dissatisfied
providers of services. Under the Act, the federal government reim
burses providers on a reasonable cost basis 17 for inpatient hospital ex
penses. 18 A provider submits an annual cost report to a financial
intermediary three months after the close of the provider's fiscal
year.19 The cost report includes costs incurred for services rendered to
beneficiaries within the reporting period. 20
In a cost report, providers separately record reimbursable costs
(as defined by statutory, regulatory and/or policy provisions) and
nonreimbursable costs, with nonreimbursable costs listed in a section
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (1982) provides: "The reasonable cost of any serv
ices shall be the cost actually incurred, excluding therefrom any part of incurred cost found
to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services, and shall be determined
in accordance with regulations establishing the method or methods to be used...." Id.
Prior to 1972, Medicare providers were reimbursed for the reasonable costs incurred
in caring for Medicare beneficiaries. However, as the reasonable costs incurred began to
exceed the amount normally charged to non-program beneficiaries, Congress feared that
the Medicare program was bearing part of the costs of treating non-program patients.
Thus, in 1972 Congress amended the Medicare statute to require that the pro
gram reimburse providers the lesser of "the reasonable cost of services ... or the
customary charges with respect to such services." In other words, if a provider
incurs costs with respect to a service which are greater than the amount the pro
vider would normally charge non-Medicare patients for the service, Medicare will
only reimburse the provider the amount of the customary charge. The remainder
of the costs are disallowed, no matter how reasonable. Likewise, if a provider's
cost with respect to a service are [siclless than the amount normally charged for
the service Medicare will reimburse the provider only for its reasonable costs.
Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 632 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D.
Mass. 1987) (citations omitted).
The 1983 Amendments to the Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 98-2, 97 Stat. 65, created a
prospective payment system to be effective on October I, 1983. Under this system, hospi
tals are paid a predetermined amount according to a standard national rate calculated for
470 treatment categories or "Diagnosis Related Groups." However, payment for other
costs related to inpatient services are still made on a reasonable cost basis. See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 412.1-.2 (1987). Reasonable cost reimbursement is used for capital related costs, direct
medical education costs, anesthesia services, and kidney acquisition costs. 42 C.F.R.
§ 412.113 (1987). See also 42 U.S.c. § 1395ww(d) (1982).
18. 42 C.F.R. § 409.10 (1987) states: "[Ilnpatient hospital operating costs include
those costs (including malpractice insurance costs) for general routine service, ancillary
service, and intensive care-type unit services with respect to inpatient hospital services...."
See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 3, at 2801.
19. 42 C.F.R. § 413.24(f)(2)(i) (1987). An intermediary may grant a 30-day exten
sion of the due date for good cause. 42 C.F.R. § 413.24(f)(2)(ii) (1987).
20. 42 C.F.R. § 413.24(c) (1987).
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entitled Work Sheet A-8. 21 This practice of including nonreimbur
sable costs in the cost report but listing them on a separate work sheet
is known as "self-disallowance."22 For example, a statutory provision
excludes personal comfort items from reimbursement,23 such as a per
sonal telephone which is defined by the regulations as a personal com
fort item.24 A provider will self-disallow costs incurred in providing
personal telephones to beneficiaries by listing the costs on Work Sheet
A-8 of its medical cost report.
The intermediary audits a provider's cost report for reimbursable
costs. 2S If a provider reports a cost for reimbursement which a statute,
regulation, or policy provision prohibits from reimbursement, the in
termediary disallows the cost. The intermediary then sends a Notice
of Amount of Program Reimbursement (NPR) to the provider which
sets forth adjustments and modifications of total costs permitted for
reimbursement. 26
A provider that wishes to challenge the intermediary with respect
21. On Work Sheet A-8, a provider will list items prohibited from reimbursement
under Medicare principles. Also on this work sheet, a provider will offset costs by the
amount of revenue received to reflect actual expenses.
22. Athens Community Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 743 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C.Cir. 1984)
(Athens II).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1982).
24. 42 C.F.R. § 405.31O(j) (1987).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 413.24(c) (1987). An intermediary ini
tially conducts a desk review of the provider's cost report, followed by an extensive field
audit at the provider's principle place of business. In order for an intermediary to audit the
reimbursable costs accurately under the Medicare system, it must review the total operat
ing costs, amount of revenue received, the apportionment of costs and revenues, the com
putation of Medicare costs from total costs, and the computation of reimbursable costs
from total Medicare costs. Thus, the auditor examines each cost listed on every page of a
cost report, including Work Sheet A-8. See supra note 21. See also infra note 101. A field
audit is a very comprehensive task and may take up to four weeks to complete. Interview
with John Roemer, Vice President of Finance at Franklin Medical Center, in Greenfield,
Massachusetts (Nov. 7, 1987).
From the reported decisions, it appears that the courts are unaware of the nature and
extent of the intermediary'S auditing process. The courts focus only on the intermediary's
auditing of reimbursable costs under the Medicare system and seem unaware that the inter
mediary must audit all costs, including those on Work Sheet A-8, in order to arrive at a
reimbursement figure. Several courts have stated incorrectly that an intermediary does not
audit self-disallowed claims, and have used the finding that self-disallowed claims are not
reviewed initially by the intermediary as a basis for concluding that the Board does not
have jurisdiction. See infra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
26. 42 C.F.R. § 405. 1803(a) (1987). Intermediaries are required to send providers a
final determination within a reasonable time (12 months) after filing a cost report. 42
C.F.R. 405.1835(c) (1987). If a provider has not received a final determination within a
reasonable time, it can appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. 42 U.S.C.
§ 139500(d) (1982). The cases discussed in this comment use the term "final determina
tion" when referring to the NPR.
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to the findings in the NPR may exercise its rights to an appeal. When
the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.00,27 a provider can appeal
to the Board28 if it is dissatisfied with the intermediary's final determi
nation or if the provider has not received a NPR within a reasonable
time. 29
The Board shall have the power to affirm, modify, or reverse a final
determination of the fiscal intermediary with respect to a cost report
and to make any other revisions on matters covered by such cost
report (including revisions adverse to the provider of services) even
though such matters were not considered by the intermediary in
making such determination. 30

The decision of the Board is binding on the parties unless the Secre
tary revises, affirms, or modifies the Board's decision within sixty days
27. If the amount in controversy is more than $1,000.00 and no greater than
$10,000.00, a provider can request a hearing before an intermediary hearing officer within
180 days of receipt of the NPR. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1811(a) (1987); 42 C.F.R.
§ 405. 1809(b)(2) (1987); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at
2900.B(2).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a)(2) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405. 1835(a)(3) (1987); U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 2900.B(2).
The Board is composed of five members appointed by the Secretary. Two members
represent the providers, one of whom is a certified public accountant. All members are
knowledgeable in the field of reimbursement. 42 U.S.c. § 1395oo(h) (1982); 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1845 (1987); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 2923.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) states:
Any provider of services which has filed a required cost report within the time
specified in regulations may obtain a hearing with respect to such cost report by a
Provider Reimbursement Review Board ... if: (I) such provider
(A)(i) is dissatisfied with a final determination of the organization serving
as its fiscal intermediary ... as to the amount of total program reimbursement
due the provider ... for which payment may be made ... for the period covered
by such report, or
(ii) ...
(B) has not received such final determination from such intermediary on a
timely basis after filing such report . . .
(C) ...
(2) the amount in controversy is $10,000 or more, and
(3) such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days after notice of the
intermediary's final determination ... or with respect to appeals pursuant to para
graph (1 )(B) ... , within 180 days after notice of such determination would have
been received if such determination had been made on a timely basis.
42 U.S.C. § 13950o(a) (1982); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3,
at 2920.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(d) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1869 (1987). But see U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 2924.6. ("The Board has the authority
to affirm, modify, reverse, or otherwise revise, in whole or in part, an intermediary's deter
mination reflected in a NPR.") The manual makes no reference to the second part of the
Board's authority.
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of the provider's receipt of the final determination. 31
Either upon a provider's request or sua sponte, an intermediary
hearing officer, the Board, or the Secretary may reopen a final decision
to re-examine the correctness of its decision.32 However, the adminis
trative body has full discretion in deciding this request. According to
the Secretary's regulations, the decision on whether to reopen is not
subject to review by the Board or the courts. 33
A provider has the right to judicial review of a final decision
made by the Board or the Secretary.34 In addition, by virtue of the
1980 amendments, a provider has a right to obtain judicial review of
the Board's determination that it is without the authority to decide the
issue. 3s The Board does not have statutory authority to decide
whether a regulation or policy provision contravenes a statute or
whether a policy provision violates a regulation. The Board is bound
by the Secretary's regulations and policies. 36 Thus, for example, if a
provider challenges before the Board the legality of the Secretary's
regulation that defines personal telephones as personal comfort items,
the Board is without the authority to decide the issue. Although the
Board has limited authority concerning these issues, Board review is a
necessary precondition to judicial review. 37
31. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(f)(I) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405. 1871(b) (1987).
32. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885 (1987); u.s. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 3, at 2931.
33. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885(c) (1987); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
supra note 3, at 2931.1.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(f)(1) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1877 (1987). The provider has
to file a civil action within 60 days of receipt of a final determination in the district court for
the judicial district where the provider is located or in thepistrict Court for the District of
Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(f) (1982).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(f) (1982). The Board must determine that it is without au
thority to decide the issue within 30 days. If the Board fails to render a decision, the Board
is presumed to have no authority to decide the issue, and the provider may commence a
civil action within 60 days. Id.
36. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1867 (1987).
37. In Aristocrat South, Inc. v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1976), the pro
vider challenged a Medicare accounting regulation as being inconsistent with statutory re
imbursement procedures. The court held:
Even if initial application to the PRRB ... seems formalistic and futile ... it is a
statutory prerequisite to judicial review which must be followed. . .. [T]his Court
is not convinced that the futility of resort to the PRRB is a foregone conclu
sion. . . . This Court thus finds that ... 42 U.S.C. § 139500 provides an adminis
trative review process ... which must be resorted to as a prerequisite to obtaining
judicial review.
Id. at 26. See also Hadley Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 689 F.2d 905 (10th Cir.
1982). In Hadley, providers challenged the validity of the 1979 Malpractice Rule and ar
gued, inter alia, the futility of presenting a challenge to the Board in order to obtain judicial
review. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the providers' futility argument be
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Prior to the 1980 amendments, providers were required to con
duct a full review of such challenges before the Board in order to ob
tain judicial review. 38 This time-consuming and inconsequential
administrative review procedure delayed the resolution of disputed
matters for extended periods of time. 39 The amendment gives provid
ers a vehicle to obtain immediate judicial review in instances where the
Board determines that it lacks the authority to grant the relief
sought,40
II.

THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON BOARD JURISDICTION

This section presents the conflicting case law interpreting the
Board's governing statute prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Bethesda. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ath
ens Community Hospital, Inc. v. Schweiker {Athens II),41 presented a
restrictive interpretation to the Board's governing statute. In that
case, the court held that the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear any
claims not listed for reimbursement in the provider's cost report. This
restrictive interpretation subsequently was endorsed by the Sixth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals in two factually distinct cases. This discussion
notes that because Board review is a prerequisite to judicial review, the
effect of this restrictive interpretation is to deny providers their statucause a "final decision" by the SecretarY is a necessary prerequisite to obtain federal court
jurisdiction. Id. at 910.
The futility of presenting a regulatory challenge to the Board when the Board has no
authority to grant the relief sought was an issue prior to the enactment of the 1980 amend
ments to subsection (f) of the Board's governing statute. Although courts recognized the
futility of presenting such a claim, it was clear from the statute that Congress intended
providers to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to obtaining judicial review. The
original grant of jurisdiction of subsection (f) requires a final decision by the Board as a
prerequisite to judicial review. See infra text accompanying notes 105-15.
In the absence of statutory authority, section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act
limits judicial review of an administrative action to "final agency action." The requirement
of final agency action as a prerequisite to judicial review serves many purposes. It avoids
premature judicial involvement in the agency decision-making process; it makes judicial
deference to administrative action possible; and it provides a detailed statement of the
agency's actions and evidence. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS 182 (1985).
The 1980 amendment provides a somewhat quicker and easier process for providers to
exhaust their administrative remedies and to obtain judicial review by requiring only a
determination by the Board that it has no authority to decide the issue presented by the
provider. See infra text acCompanying notes 105-15.
38. H.R. REp.
No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 394, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE
j.
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5526, 5757.
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
41. 686 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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tory right to judicial review of the Secretary's regulations and policy
provisions.
The contrary approaches taken by the First, Eleventh, Ninth, and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals assure providers their right to judi
cial review of regulations and policy provisions. Each of these courts
either allows or requires the Board to exercise jUrisdiction to hear self
disallowed claims. However, the courts differ markedly in the ration
ale of their decisions.
A.

The Athens II Approach: The Board Lacks Jurisdiction

Although the Board was established in 1972,42 the scope of the
Board's jurisdiction was not reviewed judicially until 1982 by the Dis
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens Community Hos
pital, Inc., v. Schweiker (Athens 1).43 In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held. that the
Board did not have authority to review claims that were not included
in the provider's cost report.
In Athens I, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) filed timely
cost reports for fiscal years 1973 and 1974.44 When HCA received its
notice of rejrnbursement for 1973, it filed an appeal with the Board
contesting six adjustments. 4s Prior to the Board's decision, HCA re
quested permission from the intermediary to amend its 1973 and 1974
cost reports to include claims for reimbursement for stock option costs
and federal income tax payments which it had omitted from its origi
nal filings inadvertently.46 The intermediary denied the request for
amendments,47 and HCA asked the Board to consider these claims for
,
42. The Board was created in 1972, but it did not review its first case until 1975.
However, it was not until seven years later that providers challenged the Board's decisions
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear provider's self-disallowed claims. While Arthur Owens
was chairman of the Board from 1975 to 1980, the Board did not recognize a providers'
right to appeal a claim not initially requested for reimbursement. However, in 1980, Wil
liam Tierney replaced Arthur Owens as chairman. From approximately 1980 to 1982, the
Board allowed providers the right to appeal to the Board those claims which they initially
failed to present to the intermediary for reimbursement. The Board soon became so over
whelmed with these types of claims that Mr. Tierney sent a letter to providers informing
them that the Board no longer would exercise jurisdiction over self-disallowed claims. Tel
ephone Interview with Arthur Owens, Member of the Provider Reimbursement Review
Board (Sept. 24, 1987).
43. 686 F.2d 989, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1982), modified, Athens II, 743 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.
1984).
44. Id. at 991.
45. Id. There was no dispute that the Board had jurisdiction to hear arguments
concerning the intermediary's six adjustments to HCA's 1973 cost report.
46. Id. at 991-92.
47. The intermediary denied HCA's request to reopen not because the claims were
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reimbursement. The Board refused to review these claims because
they were not filed within the time required by the regulation. 48
In affirming the Board's decision that it did not have jurisdiction
over that portion of HCA's appeal that concerned the late-filed claims,
Judge Bork, writing for the court, focused on the statute governing the
Board's authority, quoting part of, and emphasizing section
13950o(d): "The Board ~hall have the power to affirm, modify, or re
verse a final determinatiop of the fiscal intermediary with respect to a
cost report and to make any other revisions on matters covered by such
cost report . ... "49 The c~urt interpreted this provision as limiting the
Board's authority to matters included in the cost report and excluding
from the Board's authority all claims not reported in the cost report. so
Therefore, because HC~jnadvertently omitted claims for stock option
costs and federal income taxes when it submitted its cost report to the
fiscal intermediary, the Board had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of
these claims.
Following a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a
related but factually distinct case,S! HCA successfully petitioned for
rehearing, after which the court, in a decision known as Athens II,s2
revised the reasoning but affirmed the result of Athens 1.53 The new
issue in Athens II was the provider's contention that the second part of
section 13950o(d), the statute which governs the Board's authority
and which the court relied on in Athens I, allowed the Board to con
sider costs not specifically claimed or shown in the cost report. 54
untimely, but because the claims were not reimbursable under the Medicare regulations.
Id. at 992.
48. Id. HCA appealed the Board's decision to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. The court addressed the issue of whether an intermediary's deci
sion not to reopen to consider new claims was reviewable. The court held that because
these claims were not presented to the intermediary initially, its decision not to reopen was
an initial decision (on the claims), in contrast to a final decision, and thus was reviewable.
Athens, 514 F. Supp. 1336, 1339-40 (D. D.C. 1981). The Secretary of the Department of
Health & Human Services then appealed the district court's decision to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
49. Athens I, 686 F.2d at 995 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 139500(d)(1982» (emphasis in
Athens /).
50. Id. at 995.
51. Following Athens I, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the statute
defining the Board's authority vests broad power in the Board to decide claims totally
excluded from the cost report. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center v. Department of
Health & Human Serv., 698 F.2d 1337, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 124-29 and
accompanying text.
52. Athens Community Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 743 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ath
ens II).
53. Id. at 4-8.
54. Id. at 2.
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The Athens II analysis of subsection (d) limited the Board's au
thority to costs included in the final determination and costs claimed
for reimbursement. 55 The first jurisdictional grant limits the Board's
jurisdiction to a "final determination,"56 the second grant limits the
Board's jurisdiction to "matters covered by such cost report."57 Ac
cording to Judge Bork, these two phrases are analogous. He reasoned
that an intermediary does not make a final determination on a specific
cost unless that cost was claimed for reimbursement. Thus, the Board
haS jurisdiction to consider "matters covered by ... [the] cost report"
only if the cost was listed in the cost report and "added into the final
figure ,of reimbursement requested. "58 Therefore, if a cost is not dis
closed to the intermediary initially, which to the Athens II court
meant claimed for reimbursement, it is not "covered by such cost re
port" and the statute precludes the Board from exercising jurisdiction
~ over the provider's claim. 59
The court pointed out that this analysis "must be read in light of
the Board's functions" in subsection (a).60 That subsection requires
that a provider be dissatisfied with an intermediary's final determina
tion in order to appeal to the Board. 61 According to the court, if a
55. Id. at 4. The Athens II court stated that § 139500(d) contains two separate juris
dictional grants.
First, the PRRB has "the power to affirm, modify, or reverse a final determina
tion of the fiscal intermediary with respect to a cost report." 42 U.S.C.
§ 139500(d) (1982). Second, the PRRB has the power "to make any other revi
sions on matters covered by such cost report (including revisions adverse to the
provider" of services) even though such matters were not considered by the inter
mediary in making such final determination."
Id. While the court failed to mention, let alone discuss, this second part in Athens I, the
court of appeals in Athens II devoted considerable attention to a review and analysis of
subsection (a) and both parts of subsection (d).
56. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 4-5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
59. Id. With regard to this issue, Athens II goes far beyond Athens I, where the court
in dicta seemed to endorse self-disallowance. The court stated in Athens I that a self-disal
57.

58.

lowed cost is different from a totally omitted cost because those
costs [are] timely disclosed to the intermediary. By making such disclosure, the
provider gives the intermediary an opportunity at that point to decide that reim
bursement is proper. The provider also puts the Medicare system on notice that
the costs exist and may be claimed at some stage if it later becomes likely that
such costs should be considered reimbursable. The providers' "self disallow
ances" are thus analogous to a disallowance by the intermediary of costs claimed
in the initial cost report.
Athens I, 686 F.2d at 997.
60. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 6.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a) (1982). See also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying
text.
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"cost report" was construed to include costs not claimed for reim
bursement, a provider could allege dissatisfaction with the final deter
mination whenever the intermediary did not allow reimbursement for
an undisclosed cost. 62 As the court stated:
It simply is not plausible to contend that Congress has created a
scheme wh~re the provider can claim dissatisfaction and have re
course to an appeal procedure because the intermediary failed to
read the provider's mind and anticipate all those things the pro
vider would like to be reimbursed for, even though it did not request
them. 63

As the final part of the court's statutory analysis, the court fur
ther reviewed the second jurisdictional grant of subsection (d), which
permits the Board to "make ... revisions on matters covered by such
cost report . . . even though such matters were not considered by the .
intermediary in making such final determination."64 In order to give
effect and consistency to both clauses in subsection (d), the court con
strued this provision as giving the Board the authority to revise claims
not considered by the intermediary only as a means to accommodate
claims contested by the provider. 6s
The Athens II court also predicted that significant adverse conse
quences would result if the providers' interpretation was upheld and
the Board was required to review costs not presented to the intermedi
ary initially.66 According to Judge Bork, such a broadened interpreta
tion would eliminate a necessary tier of review, render meaningless the
time limits for filing cost reports, undermine the effectiveness of the
reopening regulations, and cause frivolous padding of claims in cost
reports.67 In his view, then, practical policy considerations reinforced
his reading of the jurisdictional statutes.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the District of
Columbia Circuit's restrictive approach to two factual settings that are
62. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 6.
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 13950o(d) (1982). While the Sevendi'Circuit Court of Appeals had
used this language to find Board jurisdiction, see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text,
Judge Bork gave it a narrower reading.
65. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 9. For example, a provider may self-disallow certain med
ical malpractice expenses. When the intermediary audits the provider's cost report, it
might disallow other costs associated with medical malpractice expenses that the provider
claimed for reimbursement. The provider may contest these disallowed costs before the
Board, and if the intermediary prevails, these claims will be added to those which the
provider already disallowed.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id.
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distinct from the Sixth Circuit's first analysis of the Board's jurisdic
tional scope. 68 One case involved a claim that was mistakenly self
disallowed by a provider, and the other case involved a claim properly
self-disallowed because a regulation prohibited reimbursement. In the
cases involving the latter type of claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap
peals followed Athens II, but did so reluctantly.
In University of Cindnnati v. Secretary ofHealth & Human Serv
ices,69 the court held that the Board did not have jurisdiction over self
disallowed claims because these claims were not included in an inter
mediary's final determination. University Hospital self-disallowed
claims for education costs of interns and residents and related overhead expenses in connection with the hospital's family practice and
psychiatric clinics for fiscal years 1979 through 1981, mistakenly be
lieving them to be nonreimbursable costS.70 When the provider re
ceived its Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR), it requested a
hearing before the Board. The Board denied jurisdiction over the pro
vider's claims because they were not requested for reimbursement in
the cost reports for the years in question. 71
The court held that presenting the disputed cost to the intermedi
ary is a prerequisite to an appeal to the Board.72 Because subsection
(a) gives the Board jurisdiction only over an intermediary'S final deter
mination,73 a cost must be reported in the final determination in order
for the Board to have jurisdiction. Because a self-disallowed claim is
not subject to revisions or modifications and is not included in a final
determination, the court concluded that the Board has no jurisdiction
68. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also has decided a case factually similar to
Athens II. In Saline Community Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 744 F.2d
517 (6th Cir. 1984), the court held that the Board lacks jurisdiction over claims not re
ported initially in a cost report.
Three nonprofit hospitals did not include a claim for reimbursement for a return on
net-invested equity capital in their 1979 cost reports. Id. at 518. Prior to the intermedi
ary's final determination, they requested to amend their cost reports to include these
claims. The intermediary denied their request to amend because it was untimely. The
providers appealed the intermediary's decision to the Board. However, the Board denied
jurisdiction over the claims because they were not included in the intermediary's final de
termination. Id.
The court, following Athens II, affirmed the Board's decision that it lacked jurisdiction
.to review self-disallowed claims. However, rather than extensively analyzing subsections
(a) and (d), the court focused its analysis on whether the court had jurisdiction to decide
the correctness of the Board's determination. Id. at 518-19.
69. 809 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988).
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 312.
73. See supra note 29.
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over the claim. 74
While the court's ruling deprived the provider of a second chance
to request reimbursement for a claim it mistakenly self-disallowed, it
was the correct decision in light of the facts of the case. Congress
intended the Board to settle cost disputes between fiscal intermediaries
and providers. 75 In University of Cincinnati, however, there was no
cost dispute. The provider did not dispute the correctness or validity
of a cost but instead requested reimbursement of a cost it self-disal
lowed because of its own error.
While willing to apply Athens II to the factual setting presented
74. University 0/ Cincinnati, 809 F.2d at 312. Although the court adopted the Athens
II interpretation of subsection (a), it rejected the Athens II interpretation of the second part
of the Board's jurisdictional authority in subsection (d). Subsection (d) allows the Board to
affirm, modify, or reverse matters covered by a cost report "even though such matters were
not considered by the intermediary in making such final determination." 42 U.S.C.
§ 139500(d) (1982) (emphasis added). See Supra text accompanying note 30. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals used the conventional definition of the term "consider" and con
strued it as it is applied in subsection (d) to mean "attentively inspected or examined."
University o/Cincinnati, 809 F.2d at 314 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC
TIONARY 568 (2d ed. 1942». Applying this definition to the second part of the Board's
authority, the court concluded that a claim is a " 'matter ... in the cost report' " only if it
is subject to the intermediary's inspection or examination. Therefore, the court interpreted
this clause as giving the Board the authority to revise only reimburseable costs that the
intermediary overlooked. Id. at 314.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 808
F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988), presents a case
factually similar to University 0/ Cincinnati. In North Broward, the hospital incurred large
tax expenses in its fiscal year 1977. It initially included these costs for reimbursement in its
cost report but later mistakenly self-disallowed them. Id. at 1407. North Broward ap
pealed the intermediary'S final determination to the Board to claim reimbursement for
these expenses. The Board denied jurisdiction because they were not presented initially as
reimbursable costs in the provider's cost report. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Athens II approach and affirmed
the Board's lack of jurisdiction. The court stated that "[t]he only plausible construction of
§ 139500(d) requires that an expense be overtly disclosed and contested before the fiscal
intermediary in order to be a 'matter covered by such cost report' and appealable before the
[Board]...." Id. at 1409. Further, the Court agreed with Athens II that if the Board has
jurisdiction over nonreimbursable claims there will be significant adverse practical conse
quences.Id. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
75. H.R. REP. No. 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD
MIN. NEWS 4898, 5094. The legislative history states:
Under present law there is no specific provision for an appeal by a provider of
services of a fiscal intermediary's final reasonable cost determination. Although
the HEW has developed administrative procedures to assist providers and in
termediaries to reach reasonable and mutually satisfactory settlements of disputed
reimbursement items, your committee believes that it is desirable to prescribe in
law a specific procedure for settling disputed final determinations applying to the
amount of program reimbursement.
Id.
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in University of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was
reluctant to do so in the different context presented by Baptist Hospital
East v. Secretary ofHealth & Human Services. 76 In Baptist, five hospi
tals sought judicial review of the Secretary's regulation denying reim
bursement for bad debts, charity and courtesy allowances. 77 Four of
the hospitals did not comply with the regulation and claimed reim
bursement for a portion of the expenses in the regular part of their cost
report. However, William Booth Memorial Hospital complied with
the regulation and self-disallowed costs for free services by reporting
them on Work Sheet A-8 in its cost report for fiscal year 1981. The
Board granted jurisdiction to the four noncomplying hospitals but de
nied jurisdiction to William Booth because it failed to present costs for
free services to the intermediary initiallyJ8
Although it quoted significant sections of Athens II and affirmed
the Board's decision, the court recognized that in cases involving chal
lenges to a regulation, unlike the situation presented in Athens II and
Saline Community Hosp. v. Secretary ofHealth & Human Services,79 it
is futile to require the providers to present these claims initially to the
intermediary.80 The intermediary is bound by the Secretary's regula
tions, has no authority to alter them, and must deny a claim for costs
disallowed by a regulation. 81 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit Court of
76. 802 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 862. Specifically, the providers contended that 42 C.F.R. § 413.80 (origi
nally 405.420) (1987) was in conflict with the reasonable cost provision of the Medicare
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(v)(I)(a) (1982). Bad debts, charity, and courtesy allowances are
defined as follows:
(I) Bad Debts. Bad debts are amounts considered to be uncollectible from ac
counts and notes receivable that were created or acquired in providing services.
"Accounts receivable" and "notes receivable" are designations for claims arising
from the furnishing of services, and are collectible in money in the relatively near
future.
(2) Charity allowances. Charity allowances are reductions in charges made by
the provider of services because of the indigence or medical indigence of the pa
tient. Cost of free care (uncompensated services) furnished under a Hill-Burton
obligation are considered as charity allowances.
(3) Courtesy allowances. Courtesy allowances indicate a reduction in charges in
the form of an allowance to physicians, clergy, members of religious orders, and
others as approved by the governing body of the provider, for services received
from the provider. Employee fringe benefits, such as hospitalization and person
nel health programs, are not considered to be courtesy allowances.
42 C.F.R. § 413.8O(b)(1)(2) and (3) (1987).
,
78. Baptist, 802 F.2d at 862. In an unreported decision, the district court held that a
provider's self-disallowance is not a matter covered by a cost report and does not preserve
the jurisdiction of the Board. The provider appealed this decision. Id. at 862-63.
79. 744 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1984). See supra note 66.
80. Baptist, 802 F.2d at 864.
81. Id. at 865.
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Appeals reasoned that requiring the provider to exhau,st its adminis
trative remedies by presenting its distinctly legal challenge to the inter
mediary served no purpose. 82
The court properly applied the Athens II analysis to the factual
setting presented in University of Cincinnati because the provider in
that case was not challenging the Secretary's regulations or policy pro
visions, but was requesting reimbursement of a claim that it had mis
takenly self-disallowed. As stated in Athens II, the administrative
appeals process was not designed to assist providers in requesting re
imbursement for a claim they mistakenly did not present to an inter
mediary. However, as the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Baptist recognized, this analysis should not apply to legitimate, self
disallowed claims. The application of this restrictive interpretation to
such claims denies providers their statutory right to judicial review of
the Secretary's regulations. In recognition of this fact, other courts
have developed alternative interpretations of the Board's jurisdictional
statutes.
B.

Decisions Finding Discretionary and Mandatory Jurisdiction

Four United States Courts of Appeals have interpreted subsec
tions (a), (d), and (f) of section 139500 to permit the Board to exercise
jurisdiction over self-disallowed claims. 83 Although their rationales
differ, the result is that providers in those circuits have the opportunity
to seek judicial review of the Secretary's regulations and policies. This
section first discusses a decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
holding that the Board has discretion to decide whether to review a
provider's claim, but must exercise that discretion in a reasoned, law
82. Id. For a factually similar case, see Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley v.
Health & Human Servs., 770 F.2d 1257 (4th Cir. 1985). The providers wished to challenge
the Secretary's policy provision of including patients in the labor/delivery room in the
overall patient count at the midnight census hour. Id. at 1258. The complying hospitals
self-disallowed the costs that were prohibited from reimbursement while the noncomplying
hospitals included prohibited costs in their cost reports for reimbursement. Id. The Board
denied jurisdiction to the complying hospitals. Id.
The court held "that a provider must affirmatively place an issue in controversy at the
time it files its cost report in order to preserve its ability to appeal the matter to . . . the
[Board]." Id. at 1262-63. Because the complying hospitals, by self-disallowing these costs,
did not notify the intermediary of its intent to challenge the policy, the Board lacked juris
diction over these claims. Id. at 1263.
83. Saint Luke's Hosp. "v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 810 F.2d 325 (1st
Cir. 1987); Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435 (11th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988); Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 817
F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988); Saint Mary of
Nazareth Hosp. Center v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.2li 1337 (7th Cir.
1983).
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ful, manner. This section then presents the approaches of the Elev
enth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals which have
interpreted the governing statutes to require the Board to exercise ju
risdiction over self-disallowed claims.
1.

o

Saint Luke's Hospital v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services 84

In Saint Luke's, the First Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
subsection (d) as granting the Board discretion to decide whether to
hear providers' claims not presented to the intermediary. In that case,
the provider included in its 1978 cost report sick leave expenses paid
to its employees for their unused sick days.85 The intermediary disal
lowed the expenses and Saint Luke's appealed to the Board. 86 While
its 1978 appeal was pending, it filed its 1979 cost report, self-disallow
ing sick leave expenses for that year. S7 After receiving its 1979 final
determination, Saint Luke's appealed several aspects of it to the
Board, including the disallowance of its sick leave expenses. 88 After
consolidating the 1978 and 1979 appeals, the Board awarded the 1978
sick leave expenses. 89 However, the Board ruled that it lacked juris
diction to hear the 1979 claims because they were not presented to the
intermediary in the 1979 cost report.90
The court of appeals held that the Board has discretion to hear a
84. 810 F.2d 325 (1st Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 326-27. Under Saint Luke's sick pay/sick leave plan,
full time employees earn one day of sick leave per month, and are allowed to
accumulate sick days from year to year up to a maximum of 60 days. . .. Em
ployees who do not use their accumulated days of sick leave prior to terminating
their employment can acquire a vested right to a cash payment for their unused
sick days upon termination.
Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 632 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (0.
Mass. 1986).
86. Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 327. The intermediary disallowed these costs because
the provider reimbursement manual requires that a provider report these costs when they
are paid, and Saint Luke's reported the costs when they became vested. See U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 2144.8. Saint Luke's argued that the man
ual was inconsistent with departmental regulations which provide that expenses are to be
recorded whenever they are incurred, regardless of when they are paid. 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.24(a) (formerly 405.453(b)(2) (1987».
87. Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 327.
88. Id.
89. Id. However, the Secretary reversed the 1978 award for sick leave expenses, and
Saint Luke's appealed to the diStrict court. Id.
90. Saint Luke's, 632 F. Supp. at 1390. The district court held that "where a pro
vider is denied reimbursement for a claimed cost, and in a subsequent year, self-disallows
that same type of cost while its appeal of the initial denial is still pending, the Board has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal concerning the self-disallowed cost." Id. at 1394.

,
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provider's claim. 91 The court based its reasoning on section 13950o(d)
which begins: "The Board shall have the power...."92 The court
stated that "[t]he statute does not say that the Board must consider
matters not considered by the intermediary. But, it does says [sic] the
Board may...."93
In contrast to Athens II, the court viewed the second part of sub
section (d) as granting the Board the authority to consider claims not
mentioned explicitly in an intermediary's final determination. 94 Judge
Breyer, writing for the court, reasoned that Congress had established
the Board as "a kind of 'hybrid,' exhibiting some features of initial fact
finding ... and some features of review."95 As a hybrid, the Board
could receive new information and data which may result in revisions
and modifications that the intermediary and provider did not antici
pate. 96 Comparing the Board's reviewing features with those of appel
late courts, the court observed that "appellate courts, in reviewing the
judgments of district courts, will normally not consider issues not
raised below ... but will nonetheless in 'exceptional cases or particular
circumstances ... review questions of law neither pressed nor decided
below.' "97
The court remanded the case to the Board with instructions to
use its discretionary authority to decide whether to hear the provider's
claim and to articulate the reasons for its exercise of discretion. 98
Since the court invalidated the Board's statutory argument that it
lacked the power to hear a provider's self-disallowed claim, the Board
91. Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 327.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(d) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 30 for the full
text of § 139500(d).
93. Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 327. The Saint Luke's court did not limit the Board's
jurisdiction to self-disallowed claims. In the court's view, the Board has to exercise discre
tion to decide whether to hear all types of claims, including totally omitted claims.
94. Id. at 328.
95. Id.
96. Id. However, the court did not analyze the jurisdictional requirements set forth
in subsection (a).
97. Id. (citations omitted) "The basic legal principle in respect to review of matters
not raised below ... is not 'never,' it is 'hardly ever'; the legal power exists; a reviewing
body exercises it sparingly." Id. at 329. But see North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 808
F.2d 1405, 1409 n.6 (l1th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988). There
the court stated that
[t]he reimbursement review procedure is modeled after the civil litigation proce
dure, and the [Board's] review of the fiscal intermediary'S decision is limited in
the same manner as an appellate court's review of a trial decision: the claim had
to be brought at the initial hearing to be recognized on appeal.
Id.
98. Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 333.
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must decide on remand as a matter of Board policy whether it will
review the claim. 99 Therefore, the Board is not precluded from deny
ing review to a provider with a self-disallowed claim, but its reasoning
must be based on policy rather than the absence of statutory power.

2.

Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen 100

In Tallahassee, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals formulated
a unique approach for determining when the Board has jurisdiction
over self-disallowed claims. Factually similar to Bethesda, Tallahassee
involved providers who complied with the 1979 Malpractice Rule lOl
and self-disallowed malpractice insurance costs not permitted under
the rule.102 The hospitals requested that the Board grant review of
their appeal so they could challenge the validity of the regulation in
99. The court's holding that the Board has the discretion to review a self-disallowed
claim is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). In Chenery, the Court held that the judiciary can review an
agency's actions only on the grounds stated by the agency. Id. "If those grounds are inad
equate or improper ... the court must reverse the agency action even if the action could be
affirmed on a basis not stated by the agency." R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra
note 37, at 356 (discussing Chenery).
100. 815 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988).
101. The case involved two consolidated appeals of 35 hospitals. Thirty hospitals
claimed reimbursement for malpractice insurance costs using the pre-1979 malpractice
rule. However, five hospitals complied with the 1979 malpractice rule and self-disallowed
costs prohibited from reimbursement. Tallahassee, 815 F.2d at 1441.
Under the pre-1979 rule, medical malpractice insurance was reimbursed according to
the percentage of Medicare patient utilization of the medical facility. Id., at 1445 n.13. For
example, if a hospital had a Medicare utilization rate of 43%, the hospital would be reim
bursed 43% of its malpractice insurance costs. Id. at 1440.
The 1979 Malpractice Rule reduced the total amount of reimbursement due a provider
under the pre-1979 rule. Under the 1979 Malpractice Rule, if a provider had paid any
malpractice claims to Medicare patients over the preceding five years, it would be rein}
bursed for insurance premiums by the percentage of those claims paid to Medicare patients.
Id. at 1440. However, if no malpractice claims were paid in the preceding five years, the
hospital would be reimbursed for insurance premiUIns based on an average national figure
set at 5.1 %. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 2163.3(c). For
a full explanation of the method, see 42 C.F.R. § 413.56 (1987); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 2163.
Because a majority of Medicare patients are elderly, there are very few malpractice
payments made to Medicare patients. Therefore, a majority of hospitals are reimbursed on
the national rate of 5.1 %. Interview with John Roemer, Vice-President of Finance at
Franklin Medical Center, in Greenfield, Massachusetts (Nov. 7, 1987).
An example of the amount of money at stake in these challenges is illustrated in Lloyd
Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985). In that case, two
hospitals had a 32% and 42% Medicare patient uti1ization rate, respectively. Because the
hospitals did not pay any malpractice claims to Medicare patients, they were limited to
reimbursement based on the national rate of 5.1%. The amounts at issue were $13,191.00
and $10,626.00, respectively. Id. at 1564.
102. Tallahassee, 815 F.2d at 1457.
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court.103 However, the Board ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because
the providers did not request reimbursement for the claims and thus
the final determination did not include any adjustments related to
these claims. 104
Unlike the previous courts, which focused their analyses on sub
sections (a) and (d) of section 139500, the court of appeals in Tallahas
see centered its analysis on subsection (f),105 which grants to providers
the right to judicial review in two instances. 106 Under the 1972
grant,107 providers have a right to obtain judicial review of any final
decision by the Board or Secretary. Additionally, under the 1980
grant, providers may obtain judicial review whenever the Board deter
mines that it is without the authority to decide a question of law or
regulation. l08 The Tallahassee court attached special significance to
the fact that the 1972 grant uses the word "decision" and the 1980
grant uses "determine."109 In the court's view, the 1972 grant requires
a decision or a hearing by the Board, whereas the 1980 grant requires
only a determination. There is no question that Congress enacted the
103. Id. at 1458.
104. Id. at 1442.
105. Id. at 1458.
106. Id. at 1461.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(f)(I) (Supp. II 1984) states:
Providers shall have the right to obtain judicial review of any final decision of the
Board, or of any reversal, affirmance, or modification by the Secretary. . .. Prov
iders shall also have the right to obtain judicial review of any action of the fiscal
intermediary which involves a question of law or regulations relevant to the mat
ters in controversy whenever the Board determines ... that it is without authority
to decide the question. . . .
A version of the first sentence was part of the original enactment in 1972. The Talla
court labeled this general right of review as the "1972 grant." The second sentence
hassee
o
is the "1980 grant." Tallahassee, 815 F.2d at 1461.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(I) (1982). See infra note 107 for the text of this provi
sion.
The second sentence was added by the 1980 amendments. It clarified, and perhaps
expanded, the right to obtain judicial review when the Board makes a "determination," as
opposed to a final decision, that it does not have the authority to decide the issue. See supra
notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
The dissent in Tallahassee disagreed that the self-disallowed providers are entitled to
judicial review. Judge Edmonson interpreted the 1980 grant of subsection (f) as allowing
providers the right to judicial review of "any action ofthe fiscal intermediary." Tallahassee,
815 F.2d at 1466 (Edmonson, J., dissenting). Therefore, because the self-disallowed prov
iders did not present their claims initially to the intermediary, they are not entitled to
judicial review. Justice Edmonson stated that the legislative history supports his holding.
"The history shows that Congress expedited the review process by cutting back on the
second (pRRB) stage not by minimizing the first (fiscal intermediary) stage." Id. at 1466
n.l (Edmonson, J., dissenting).
109. Tallahassee, 815 F.2d at 1~61.
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1980 grant to authorize and to encourage the Board to make determi
nations more quickly than it had been making decisions. 110 However,
the Tallahassee court sought to carry the distinction between decisions
and determinations further and related the "determination" language
of the 1980 grant to other statutory sections. The court reasoned that
because subsection (d), which sets forth the Board's decision-making
authority, mentions only decisions by the Board,lll it does not apply
to the 1980 grant. 112 However, subsection (f) explicitly states that if a
provider can obtain a hearing under subsection (a), such provider may
request the Board to make a determination that it is without the au
thority to decide the question of law or regulation. l13 Thus, for a pro
vider to obtain judicial review of agency regulations, it need only
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements under subsection (a) of the
Board's governing statute. 114
110. The legislative history is explicit. It provides:
Under present law, a provider's dissatisfaction with a particular determination
made by its fiscal intermediary on the basis of a regulation issued by a Secretary
must first be brought to the Board, even though the Board may not have the
authority to reverse or overrule the regulation. (The Board has no authority, for
example, to rule on the legality of the Secretary's regulations but it must, none
theless, conduct a full review ofthe challenge.) The effect of this process has been
to delay the resolution of controversies for extended periods of time and to re
quire providers to pursue a time-consuming and irrelevant administrative review
merely to have the right to bring suit in a U.S. District Court. Title VIII [Omni
bus Reconciliation Act] addresses this problem by giving medicare providers the
right to obtain immediate judicial review in instances where the Board determines
that it lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. This section is effective on
enactment.
H.R. REp. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 394, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 5526, 5757.
111. See supra text accompanying note 30 for the text of subsection (d).
112. Tallahassee, 815 F.2d at 1461.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(f)(I) (1982).
114. Id. In support of the Court's holding that the Board has jurisdiction over self
disallowed claims, it cited Bowen V. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct.
2133 (1986). Although Bowen involved judicial review of regulations promulgated under
Part B of the Medicare Act, the Supreme Court held that Congress clearly precluded
judicial review of the determinations of amounts of benefits due an individual under Part B,
not individual review of the method of calculation. Id. Thus, the Tallahassee court stated,
"Congress intended to restrict litigation over benefits where the underlying regulatory
scheme is clear, but did not foreclose judicial review of the regulations themselves." Talla
hassee, 815 F.2d at 1463 n.54.
For further support of the court's holding, it cited Memorial Hosp. V. Heckler, 706
F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1983), cerro denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984). Although Memorial is not
directly relevant to the issue in Tallahassee, it deals with an exception to subsection (f).
Section 139500(g) exempts from judicial review health care costs defined in 42 U.S.c.
§ 1395y (1982). The court held that subsection (g) only precludes judicial review of indi
vidual determinations by the intermediaries, not review of the regulations.
To expand the non-reviewability of intermediary decisions to include policy deci
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In Tallahassee, the court of appeals assumed that the five self
disallowing hospitals had met the jurisdictional requirements con
tained in subsection (a). liS The court did not engage in an independ
ent analysis of that subsection to determine whether providers with
self-disallowed claims satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. As a re
sult, the Tallahassee approach provides no guidance as to when self
disallowing providers are able to invoke the 1980 grant of judicial re
view contained in subsection (f).
3. Adams House Health Care v. Heckler 116
,

In Adams House, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the two relevant subsections, (a) and (d), of the Board's governing
statute. In that case, the providers complied with a policy provision
and in its 1981 cost report self-disallowed costs of equity capital in
vested for more than six months.l 17 Adams House appealed to the
Board to challenge the policy provision as being inconsistent with the
regulation that permits reimbursement of a reasonable return on eq
uity capital. I18 However, the Board denied jurisdiction over the
claims because the provider had not requested reimbursement of the
sions of the Secretary would not merely insulate from judicial scrutiny the finding
of an intermediary. It would give the Secretary virtually unbridled discretion to
prevent reimbursement through regulations. Such a result would run contrary to
the presumption favoring judicial review.
Memorial, 706 F.2d at 1133. Seea/so Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center v. Department
of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.2d 1337, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 124-29
and accompanying text.
115. Tallahassee, 815 F.2d at 1465.
116. 817 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988).
117. Id. at 589.
118. The provision in the manual provides that "[i]nvested funds are funds diverted
to income producing activities which are not related to patient care. Any portion of the
provider's general funds or operating funds invested in such activities for more than 6
consecutive months is not includable in the provider's equity capital." U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 1218.2.
The regulations require that income produced from the vested funds is to be used to
offset allowable interest expenses. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.311-.376 (1987). Thus, if providers
exclude costs from a return on net equity capital, they are in effect excluding such costs
twice. The net effect is that reimbursement for a "reasonable return on equity capital" is
reduced significantly by the exclusion required in the manual.
The Adams House case consolidated appeals from Adams House Health Care and the
Board of Trustees of Stanford University. In 1981, Stanford Hospital complied with the
policy that costs for services rendered be calculated using "average cost per diem." Later,
Stanford appealed to the Board claiming that the policy improperly required inclusion of
labor and delivery room patient days in the per diem calculation. The Board denied juris
diction over the claims because Stanford did not expressly disclose them to the intermedi
ary on the cost report. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 590.
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disputed cost in the cost report. 1l9
The court held that the Board had jurisdiction over the self-disal
lowed claims. 120 Like Athens II, the court focused its analysis on sec
tion 139500(a) and (d). While conceding that subsection (d) limits the
Board's authority to matters 'covered by a cost report, the court con
cluded "that a cost is 'covered by a cost report' if it was incurred
within the period which is the subject of the report and is reft.ected in
that report, even if it is not expressly claimed."121
The court applied this interpretation to the jurisdictional require
ment in subsection (a) that a provider be dissatisfied with a final deter
mination of the intermediary. The court of appeals stated the provider
need only be "dissatisfied with the total [dollar] amount of reimburse
ment offered by an intermediary, not with the intermediary'S reason
ing process with respect to any specific cost."122 The court's
interpretation of the Board's jurisdictional scope limits the Board's re
viewing authority to self-disallowed claims challenging the Secretary's
regulations. In this way, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provides
an interpretation of the Board's governing statute which is consistent
with the statutory language and which also serves the important policy
of judicial review of agency regulations and policies.

4. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center v. Department of
Health & Human Services 123
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has pronounced the
broadest interpretation of the Board's jurisdictional scope, holding in
Saint Mary that the Board must hear both self-disallowed claims and
claims totally omitted from the cost report. 124 In compliance with a
regulation which specifically prohibits reimbursement of expenses for
personal telephones, Saint James Hospital self-disallowed the cost of
bedside telephones in its 1977 cost report. On appeal to the Board,
Saint James challenged this regulation as being inconsistent with the
119. Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 604 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
Adams House appealed the Board's decision to the district court which held that the Board
had jurisdiction to hear self-disallowed claims. The Secretary then appealed. Id. at 117.
120. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 590-91.
121. [d. at 591. The court's analysis of subsection (a) and (d) limited the Board's
jurisdiction to self-disallowed claims, unlike the analysis in Saint Luke's, where the court
held that the Board had discretion to decide to review totally omitted as well as self-disal
lowed claims. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
122. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 592.
123. 698 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1983).
124. [d. at 1346.
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governing statute, 42 U.S.C. section 1395y.125 The Board held that it
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue. 126
In deciding the jurisdictional issue, the court focused on the lan
guage in section 139500(d) noting that the statute provides that "[t]he
Board shall have the power to ... make any other revisions on matters
covered by such cost report ... even though such matters were not con
sidered by the intermediary in making such final determination."127
Saint Mary's construed this provision as vesting broad authority with
the Board to review matters not considered by the intermediary and
granting the Board jurisdiction to hear any and all claims including
self-disallowed as well as totally omitted claims. 128 While this broad
interpretation of Board jurisdiction allows a provider the right to ob
tain judicial review of a Secretary's regulation and policy provision, it
arguably gives providers a second chance to request reimbursement for
claims omitted from a cost report as a result of a provider's negligence
or inadvertence. This result is inconsistent with the purpose of the
Board. Congress intended the Board to settle cost disputes between
intermediaries and providers. Congress did not intend the Board to
act as a supplemental agency for providers to seek reimbursement for
claims not initially presented to the intermediary due to the provider's
inadvertence or negligence. 129

III.

BETHESDA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION V. SECRETARY OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 130

The United States Supreme Court, in Bethesda Hospital Associa
tion v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, was presented with an
opportunity to resolve the controversy concerning the appropriate lim
its of the Board's reviewing authority. Pursuant to an analysis of the
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(6) (1982) prohibits reimbursement of "personal comfort
items." The Secretary's regulation defines a television set and telephones as personal com
fort items. 42 C.P.R. § 405.3100) (1987).
126. Saint Mary, 698 F.2d at 1341. Saint James appealed this decision to the district
court pursuant to § 139500(f). Without providing a statutory analysis of the Board's juris
dictional authority, the district court reached the merits of the case and ruled that a bedside
telephone furnished by a hospital was not a "personal comfort item[]." Saint James Hosp.
v. Harris, 535 F. Supp. 751, 765 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The Secretary appealed this decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first reviewed the jurisdictional issue
concerning the Board.
127. Saint Mary, 698 F.2d at 1346 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 139500(d) (1982) (emphasis
added».
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1982). See supra text accompanying note 63.
130. 108 S. Ct. 1255 (1988).
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plain-meaning of the statute, \31 the Court properly held that the
Board has jurisdiction to review self-disallowed claims challenging the
Secretary's regulations. However, the Court's approach was deficient
in two respects. Instead of restricting the interpretation of the Board's
reviewing power to self-disallowed claims and claims listed in a pro
vider's cost report, the Court seemed to endorse an approach which
also would have required the Board to hear mistakenly self-disallowed
and totally omitted claims. Second, by limiting its holding to the facts
of Bethesda, the Court missed an opportunity to declare the limits of
the Board's reviewing power.
In Bethesda, two hospitals132 complied with the 1979 Malpractice
Rule and self-disallowed costs that were prohibited from reimburse
ment under the Malpractice Rule by listing them on Work Sheet D
.8. 133 The providers appealed the validity of the 1979 Malpractice
Rule to the Board, and the Board denied jurisdiction.134 The Sixth
131. In Bethesda, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, cited Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), for support ofthe Court's
plain-meaning approach to the Board's governing statute. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1258.
However, Chevron did not endorse a plain-meaning approach to evaluate the proper inter
pretation of an ambiguous statute-:.:..a plain-meaning to an ambiguous statute. Rather,
Chevron presented a specific guideline for courts reviewing an ambiguous statute.
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it adminis
ters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). See supro note 188 for the application of
Chevron to Athens II.
132. While twenty-nine hospitals filed a group appeal to challenge the 1979 Malprac
tice Rule, only two, Bethesda and Deaconess, complied with the 1979 regulation and self
disallowed costs prohibited from reimbursement. Bethesda Hosp. v. Heckler, 609 F. Supp.
1360, 1363-64 (D. Ohio 1985).
133. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1257. For a detailed explanation of the 1979 Malprac
tice Rule, see supra note 101.
Work Sheet D-8 is entitled "Apportionment of Malpractice Insurance Costs." This
work sheet is used to compute reimbursable malpractice insurance premiums. See Form
HCFA-2552 and Related Schedules; Instructions, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) ~ 9339 (1987).
134. Bethesda and Deaconess Hospitals appealed the Board's decision to the United
States District Court for the District of Ohio. The court held that the Board had jurisdic
tion over self-<iisallowed claims and based its reasoning on the plain-meaning of subsection
(d). The court stated that the Board had jurisdiction over "those items disclosed in the cost
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Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holding that the
Board had jurisdiction over self-disallowed claims. Following Athens
II, the court reasoned that the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider
self-disallowed claims because the providers did not initially present
the claims to the intermediary. However, the court explicitly stated its
reluctance to follow Athens II.
Were we considering this issue as a matter of first impression, we
may well have reached a different conclusion as to the advisability
of requiring submission of statutory and/or constitutional chal
lenges to a private insurance company as a condition precedent to
further administrative as well as judicial review of the Secretary's
regulations. 135

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' reluctance was justified. The
United States Supreme Court recognized that the Athens II analysis is
inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The Court recognized that the
intermediary has no authority to rule on the validity of a regulatory
challenge. Therefore, pursuant to the plain-meaning of the Board's
governing statute, the Court held that the Board has jurisdiction over
providers with self-disallowed claims challenging the Secretary's
regulations. 136
•
The Supreme Court reviewed the three relevant subsections of the
statute, subsections (a), (d), and (f). Subsection (a), which sets forth
the jurisdictional requirements which a provider must satisfy to obtain
Board review, requires a provider to be "dissatisfied with a final deter
mination of ... its fiscal intermediary.... "137 Justice Kennedy, writ
ing for the Court, construed this provision as requiring the provider to
be dissatisfied with the total amount of reimbursement. 138 The Court,
therefore, rejected the Secretary's interpretation that the Board's juris
diction extends only to claims presented to the intermediary because
report such that all figures necessary to any calculations are contained in the cost report."
Bethesda, 609 F. Supp. at 1368. The court concluded that because self-disallowed claims
are calculated by subtracting non-reimbursable costs from reimbursable costs, they are
clearly "figures necessary to any calculation ... contained in the cost report." Id.
135. Bethesda v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 810 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir.
1987). The court in Athens Community Hosp. v. Schweiker (Athens I), 686 F.2d 989
(D.C. Cir. 1982), concluded that it was necessary for the provider to present the claim
initially to the intermediary in its cost report because failing to do so "would deprive [the
Board] of the intermediary's analysis and conclusions and make the PRRB the tribunal of
original jurisdiction, eliminating a tier of review, and possibly substantially slowing the
reimbursement process for other providers." Id. at 997.
136. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1259.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a) (1982). See supra note 29 for the full text of this
provision.
138. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1258.
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the provider cannot be "dissatisfied" with the final determination if the
claim is not in the provider's cost report. 139 The Court stated that this
"strained interpretation" is inconsistent with the express language of
subsection (a).l40 According to the Court, the plain meaning of the
statute does not prohibit a self-disallowing provider from being "dis
satisfied" with the total amount of reimbursement when the Secre
tary's regulations preclude the provider from requesting the claim for
reimbursement in the cost report. The Court stated that "the submis
sion of a cost report in full compliance with the unambiguous dictates
of the Secretary's rules and regulations does not, by itself, bar the pro
vider from claiming dissatisfaction with the amount of reimbursement
allowed by those regulations."141
The Court further reasoned that requiring a provider to submit a
regulatory challenge to the intermediary is not in the contemplation of
the statutory scheme. The Court emphasized that the intermediary'S
job is limited statutorily to the application of the Secretary's regula
tions and the intermediary has no authority to decide the validity of a
regulation. Therefore, the Court concluded that a provider is not re
quired to submit a regulatory challenge to the intermediary as a pre
requisite to Board review.l 42
The Court supported its interpretation of subsection (a) with an
analysis of the plain meaning of subsection (d). Subsection (d) pro
vides the Board with the authority to "make any other revisions on
matters covered by such cost report . . . even though such matters
were not considered by the intermediary...."143 The Court construed
this provision as giving the Board broad authority to review matters
not contested before the intermediary as long as such matters were
covered by the cost report. 144 The Court stated that a matter is "cov
ered by such cost report" if it was "a cost or expense . . . incurred
within the period for which the cost report was filed, even if such cost
or expense was not expressly claimed."145 In interpreting "matters
~

139. [d. at 1259.
140. Id. at 1258.
141. [d.
142. Id. at 1259-60.
143. 42 U.S.c. § 139500(d) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 30 for the lan
guage of this provision.
144. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1259.
145. [d. The Supreme Court's interpretation of subsection (d) is very similar to the
interpretation present~ by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams House, 817 F.2d
at 591. In that case, the court stated that "a cost is 'covered by a cost report' if it was
incurred within the period which is the subject of the report and is reflected in that report,
even if it is not expressly claimed." Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court either delib
erately or carelessly omitted the Adams House terminology: "is reflected in that report." [d.
;;
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covered by such cost report," the Court offers a very expansive inter
pretation of the type of claims that the Board can review. Because the
Court did not limit the Board's jurisdiction to costs "reflected in" the
cost report, the Board conceivably has jurisdiction over totally omitted
claims. 146
The Court interpreted subsection (f) as granting to providers the
right to obtain judicial review of the Board's determination that it
lacks the authority to rule on the issue presented. The Court rejected
the Secretary's contention that the statute requires a final determina
tion by the intermediary concerning the challenged claim as a precon
dition to judicial review. 147 The Secretary argued that such a
requirement is a statutory prerequisite to judicial review.l 48 The
Court, however, stated that the right to judicial review is not triggered
by the intermediary'S final determination, but is triggered by the
Board's determination that it lacks the authority to decide the matter
because the claim involves a question of law or regulation. 149 The
Court explained that the Board and the intermediary are two different
entities with two separate roles in the Medicare reimbursement
process. It is the Board's role "in shaping the controversy that is sub
ject to judicial review; the intermediary does not" shape the
controversy. ISO
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
BOARD'S GOVERNING STATUTE

The United States Supreme Court in Bethesda correctly held that
the Board has jurisdiction over providers with self-disallowed claims.
However, the Court's plain meaning approach to the statutory inter
pretation is an inappropriate method to resolve the controversy over
the limits of the Board's reviewing authority. The Court should have
considered the policy concerns implicated in the reimbursement pro
cess. This section begins by analyzing the Supreme Court's interpreta
tion of the Board's governing statute and predicts how the Courts of
Appeals will decide University of Cincinnati v. Secretary of Health &
(emphasis added). The omission of this language is critical to the interpretation presented
by the Supreme Court because the omission allows the Board to review totally omitted
claims.
146. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Saint Mary endorses a similar inter
pretation of subsection (d). See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
147. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1260.
148. Id.
149. Id.
•
150. Id.
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Human Services lSI and North Broward Hospital District v. Bowen 152 if
it adheres to its interpretation in those cases. This section next reviews
the policy considerations that the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals raised in Athens II concerning the "adverse practical con
sequences" that would occur if the Board is deemed to have jurisdic
tion over claims not presented to the intermediary. This discussion
concludes that there would be adverse consequences under the
Bethesda approach but there would not be if the Board's jurisdiction is
limited to self-disallowed claims challenging the Secretary's regula
tions and policies.
Finally, this section reasons that the Supreme Court should not
have followed the plain meaning rule but instead should have applied
an analytical approach that best effectuates policy concerns and 'con
gressional intent. The Court should have endorsed the Adams House
approach as the most reasonable and practical interpretation. The Ad
ams House approach best harmonizes the different statutory provi
sions and best serves the dual congressional goals of effectively
utilizing an administrative process to control Medicare costs and al
lowing providers judicial review of agency regulations governing the
cost control process.
A.

Analysis of the Bethesda Interpretation

The United States Supreme Court, in Bethesda, broadly inter
preted subsections (a) and (d) of the Board's governing statute based
on a plain-meaning approach. ls3 The Court attempted to present an
151. 809 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988).
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
152. 808 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1987), afJ'g North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler,
vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988). See supra note 74 for a discussion of this
case.
153. The Supreme Court applied the plain meaning rule to the interpretation of
§ 139500. According to the plain-meaning rule, "courts are bound to give effect to the
literal meaning without consulting other indicia of intent or meaning when the meaning of
the statutory text itself is 'plain' or 'clear and unambiguous.''' N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04 (1984). See also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63 (1982). Clearly, the statutory language in § 139500 is not "clear and unambig
uous." The fact that the United States Courts of Appeals have presented conflicting inter
pretations of several phrases of the Board's jurisdictional statute is evidence of the
ambiguity of the statute. "The fact that a statute has been interpreted differently by differ
ent courts has been cited as evidence that the statute is ambiguous and unclear." N.
SINGER, supra, at § 46.04. Therefore, because § 139500 is ambiguous, the Supreme Court
should have considered "other indicia of intent" to determine its meaning.
The Supreme Court should have analyzed the five different interpretations presented
by the circuit courts of appeals as well as congressional intent and policy considerations
rather than applying a plain-meaning approach to the Board's governing statute.
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interpretation that would resolve the conflict among the courts of ap
peals over the proper interpretation of the statute. However, the
Court's narrow holding and limited analysis of the statute fails to re
\olve the conflict and instead presents an ambiguous interpretation
that raises several policy concerns.
The Court construed subsection (a) as requiring the provider to
be dissatisfied with the total amount of reimbursement as a precondi
tion to obtaining Board review. 1s4 This was the interpretation which
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted in Adams House. In Ad
ams !louse, the court of appeals stated that the provider need only be
"dissatisfied
with the total [dollar] amount of reimbursement offered
\
by an intermediary."1ss In Bethesda, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the "express language of subsection (a) requires . . . [this]
result." 156
However, further examination of the Court's analysis of subsec
tion (a) presents an inconsistency with this interpretation. The Court
distinguished providers with self-disallowed claims from those that
failed to request reimbursement in their cost reports for costs which
are reimbursable under the regulations. 1s7 The Court suggested that a
provider with a totally omitted or mistakenly self-disallowed claim
will not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of subsection (a).1SS It
stated that "such defaults might well establish that a provider was sat
isfied with the amounts requested in its cost report and awarded by the
fiscal intermediary ... ."1S9 The Court's use of the words "amounts
requested" limits a provider's dissatisfaction to claims requested for
reimbursement in the provider's cost report. This is the Athens II in
terpretation of subsection (a). The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals in Athens II stated that a provider must be dissatisfied with
the final determination of the intermediary.160 If the Court's state
ment was intended to imply that providers with mistakenly self-disal
lowed or totally omitted claims should be denied Board jurisdiction, it
is inconsistent with the Court's initial interpretation of subsection (a)
because dissatisfaction with the "amounts requested" is more restric
tive than dissatisfaction with the total amount of reimbursement. Ad
ditionally, this interpretation which limits jurisdiction to providers
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1258-59.
Adams House, 817 F.2d at 592.
Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1259.
[d.
[d.
[d. (emphasis added).
Athens II, 743 F.2d at 6.
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who are dissatisfied with "amounts requested" is inconsistent with the
Court's view of subsection (d).
Subsection (d) permits the Board to exercise jurisdiction over
"matters covered by such cost report."161 The Court in its plain
meaning analysis interpreted this phrase to include "a cost or expense
that was incurred within the period for which the cost report was filed,
even if such cost or expense was not expressly claimed."162 Therefore,
under the Bethesda approach, "matters covered by such cost report"
arguably include self-disallowed as well as totally omitted and mistak
enly self disallowed claims. This expansive reading of subsection (d) is
exemplified in the Court's analysis of subsection (a). The Court ob
served that the provider "could claim dissatisfaction, within the mean
ing of the statute, without incorporating their challenge in the cost
reports filed with their fiscal intermediar[y]'''163 Thus, this expansive
interpretation of the Board's jurisdiction is inconsistent with the
Court's intimation that the provider be dissatisfied with the "amounts
requested" and awarded by the intermediary before Board jurisdiction
attaches.
Subsection (d) explicitly limits the Board's jurisdictional author
ity to "matters covered by such cost report." An interpretation of
subsection (d) that is logically consistent with the Court's initial read
ing of subsection (a) is to limit the Board's authority to matters cov
ered within the cost report. However, the Court in Bethesda
disregarded this logical consistency and' construed subsection (d) as
permitting the Board to exercise broad authority over all claims. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Saint Mary, endorsed a similar
interpretation' to subsection (d).t64 In that case, the court construed
subsection (d) as vesting broad authority in the Board to consider all
claims regardless of whether they were reported in the cost report.
The Court adhered to this broad interpretation of the Board's
governing statute and vacated and remanded two .appellate decisions
factually distinct from Bethesda. In University of Cincinnati v. Secre
tary ofHealth & Human Services 165 and North Broward Hospital Dis
trict v. Bowen,166 the providers mistakenly and inadvertently self
161. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(d) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 30 for the full
language of this provision.
162. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1259.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
165. 809 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988).
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
166. 808 F.2d 1405 (lith Cir. 1987), aff'g North Broward Hosp. Dist.v. Heckler,
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disallowed costs that were reimbursable under the Secretary's regula
tions. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, respectively,
denied Board jurisdiction over these claims. Although the courts' rea
soning was based on the restrictive interpretation of subsection (d) en
dorsed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens
II, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals were correct in
applying this restrictive interpretation to mistakenly self-disallowed
claims. The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of subsec
tion (d) will allow providers with these types of claims to bypass a
clearly prescribed tier of review. The Medicare Act and the Secre
tary's regulations require the provider to submit a cost report to the
intermediary for a cost analysis of all reimbursable costs prior to
Board review. Although the Supreme Court recognized that the
Board and intermediary are two separate entities with distinct roles,
the Court's interpretation of subsection (d) in Bethesda seemingly re
quires the Board to act as the initial tier of review of reimbursable
claims, a role statutorily designed only for the intermediary.
The Court's interpretation of subsection (d) disregards congres
sional intent, policy considerations, and the practical aspects of the
Medicare reimbursement process. By permitting the Board to con
sider totally omitted and mistakenly self-disallowed claims, the Court
disregarded the "adverse practical consequences" that the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens II predicted would oc
cur if the Board was allowed to consider claims not requested for re
imbursement in the provider's cost report. 167 The discussion now
addresses the Court's oversight.
B.

Athens II and Bethesda: Application and Limitation

The United States Supreme Court, in Bethesda, endorsed an un
duly broad interpretation of the Board's governing statute, thus invali
dating the restrictive interpretation which the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals presented in Athens II. These two interpre
tations, therefore, represent the two extreme poles in the array of pos
sible interpretations of the Board's governing statute. This discussion
suggests that the restrictive interpretation furnished by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens II is correct as applied
to totally omitted claims but incorrect as applied to self-disallowed
claims. Further, this discussion shows that the Bethesda approach will
vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988). See supra note 74 for a full discussion of
this case.

167. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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produce the "adverse practical consequences" which the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens II predicted would oc
cur if the Board is allowed to review costs that the provider has not
initially presented to the intennediary. This section concludes that the
proper interpretation of the Board's governing statute should achieve
the result the Supreme Court reached in Bethesda, namely, that the
Board should be allowed to review self-disallowed claims challenging
the Secretary's regulations. However, the proper approach to the stat
utory interpretation should be an analysis that satisfies congressional
intent, policy considerations, and best effectuates the practical aspects
of the Medicare reimbursement process. Therefore, the Supreme
Court in Bethesda should have endorsed the Adams House interpreta
tion of the Board's governing statute.
A restrictive interpretation of the Board's governing statute cor
rectly applies to the factual setting presented in Athens II. If a pro
vider with a totally omitted claim appeals to the Board to request
reimbursement of a cost, the provider has not presented its cost infor
mation on the claim to the intennediary. The Board was created as an
administrative appellate body to settle cost disputes between providers
and intennediaries. It was not created as a supplemental agency to
investigate claims for reimbursement. 168
The detennination that needs to be made to resolve totally omit
ted claims or mistakenly self-disallowed claims is purely factual. Did
Athens Community Hospital spend X. dollars on stock option costs
and federal income tax payments in 1973 and 1974? Did the Univer
sity of Cincinnati spend X dollars on educational costs for interns and
residents and related overhead expenses? Under the administrative
scheme established by Congress, such detenninatiotis are to be made
by the intennediaries and not the Board. 169 Thus, according to the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens II, the Board
has jurisdiction only over claims requested for reimbursement and
presented to the intermediary in the provider's cost report. Following
this line of reasoning, Judge Bork assumed that if the Board was to
consider all costs included in the c~st report, there would be "signifi
cant adverse practical consequences."170 However, Judge Bork's as
sumption, while correct when the Board has jurisdiction over totally
omitted and mistakenly self-disallowed claims, is erroneous when the
168. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
169. 42 U.S.C. 1395h(a) (1982).
170. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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Board is permitted to review self-disallowed claims challenging the
Secretary's regulations and policies.
In Athens L 171 the court stated that "[p]ermitting de novo claims
before the PRRB would deprive that body of the intermediary's analy
sis and conclusions and make the PRRB the tribunal of original juris
diction, eliminating a tier of review, and possibly substantially slowing
the reimbursement process for other providers."I72 Such a tier of re
view is removed if the Board is permitted to review totally omitted ot
mistake!lly self-disallowed claims. In that circumstance, the Board
would be forced to make factual findings of cost reimbursement which
is a statutorily designed role of the intermediary.173
However, even if permitting the Board to review claims not re
corded initially in the cost report eliminates a tier of review, it does not
follow that the absence of intermediary review over self-disallowed
claims is of concern. Such cases necessarily involve challenges to the
Secretary's regulations and policy provisions. Intermediaries serve a
very limited but necessary function in the Medicare reimbursement
process. The intermediary is to serve as an administrator of the Secre
tary's regulations, and to act as an information conduit and auditor. 174
According to the Supreme Court in Bethesda, when aUditing a cost
report, the intermediary's role is limited "to the mere application of
the Secretary's regulations ... [and the intermediary] is without power
to award reimbursement except as the regulations provide, and that
any attempt to persuade the intermediary to do otherwise would be
futile."17S Therefore, because the intermediary is without the author
ity to rule on the validity of a regulation or policy provision, the inter
mediary serves no purpose in an administrative appeals procedure.
Indeed at several points in its analysis in Bethesda, the Supreme
Court emphatically stressed the different roles of the intermediary and
the Board. The Court referred to the intermediary and the Board as
separate entities each serving a distinct function in the statutory
scheme. The Court emphasized that the intermediary has no author
ity to deviate from the regulations and thus presenting a challenge to
the regulations before the intermediary serves no administrative pur
pose. Therefore, the statutory scheme established by Congress does
not require such challenges to be presented initially to the intermedi
171. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reaffirmed
Athens 1,686 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in Athens II, 743 F.2d 1,6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
172. Athens I, 686 F.2d at 997.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1982).
174. Bethesda Hosp. v. Bowen, 609 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
175. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1259.
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ary, but such challenges must be brought before the Board so that it
can use its powers in subsection (f) to facilitate judiCial review.
A second "adverse practical consequence" which the Athens II
court predicted would occur if it adopted the providers' interpretation
is that it would nullify the reopening regulations. 176 The court feared
that allowing a provider to present claims for reimbursement after the
intermediary denied its request for reopening would "eviscerate" the
finality provision. 177 According to the Secretary's regulation, an inter
mediary's decision to deny reopening is not reviewable by the Board or
the courts. 178
Under the broad interpretation presented by the Supreme Court
in Bethesda, the Board will be forced to reopen the cost report to con
sider whether a provider should be reimbursed for a particular cost. If
the Board declines to make that factual determination, it could, argua
bly, require the intermediary to reopen the cost report thereby eviscer
ating the finality provision. However, a provider that self-disallows a
claim because a regulation or policy prohibits reimbursement would
not request a reopening hearing before the intermediary. If a regula
tion or policy prohibits reimbursement, the intermediary has no au
thority to determine whether a regulation or policy provision is valid.
Therefore, the reopening regulations would not be affected if the
Board's jurisdiction was limited to review of self-disallowed claims.179
Lastly, Athens II suggests that if the Board was allowed to have
jurisdiction to review a claim not requested for reimbursement in the
provider's cost report, it would encourage frivolous reporting of
nonreimbursable claims: 180
0

[A] provider could list every conceivable cost on its cost report,
without claiming reimbursement, and hope that the intermediary
will reimburse it for the reported but unclaimed costs, secure that it
nevertheless will have until 180 days following the NPR to concoct
176. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 7-8. The providers urged the court to interpret the
Board's jurisdictional authority to allow review of all costs whether or not claimed in the
cost report. Id.
177. Id. at 7. The finality provision 42 C.F.R. § 405. 1885(c)(1987) states that the
"[j]urisdiction for reopening a determination or decision rests exclusively with that admin
istrative body that rendered the last determination or decision." Id.
178. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885(c) (1987).
179. Even if a provider is allowed to appeal to the Board for reimbursement of a self
disallowed claim after the intermediary has denied reopening, it does not "eviscerate" the
finality provision. An "[a]ppeal to the Board does not force an intermediary to reopen its
deliberations against its will." Adams House, 817 F.2d at 593. The Board would review
only those claims that the provider wished to bring before the intermediary in a reopening
hearing.
180. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 6.
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some reasons to urge upon the [Board] for reimbursement of the
unclaimed coStS.18l
However, providers only are allowed reimbursement for those claims
that Congress has authorized expressly. The Secretary has promul
gated regulations and policies to be used as guidelines for calculating
and interpreting costs permitted for reimbursement. If a provider
claims costs in its report in violation of these policies and regulations,
it is subject to criminal and administrative penalties. The Medicare
Act provides an anti-fraud provision to deter these types of abuses. 182
Thus, if a provider "knowingly and willfully" makes a false statement
or representation on a cost report, it is subject to penalties under this
provision. 183
Therefore, this adverse practical consequence will not occur if the
Board is permitted to review self-disallowed claims as well as mistak
enly self-disallowed. and totally omitted claims. Under the Bethesda
approach, the Board seems to have authority to review claims not re
ported in the provider's cost report so there is no incentive to include
frivolous claims in the report.
Although the Court of Appeals in Athens II feared providers
would" report frivolous, nonreimbursable claims, the Athens II ap
proach ironically encourages providers to include impermissible,
nonreimbursable claims with its reimbursable claims. The Secretary
instituted a scheme to assist providers in obtaining Board review to
challenge regulations and policy provisions that are inconsistent with
the anti-fraud provision. Under this scheme, a provider "knowingly
and willfully" claims a cost that is nonreimbursable, but "preserve[s]
[its] appeal rights by ... disclosing the existence of such costs to the
Medicare intermediary.;'184 The purpose of this scheme is to notify
181. Id.
182. This provision states:
Whoever-(l) knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false state
ment or representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or
payment under this subchapter, (2) at any time knowingly and willfully makes or
causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material fact for use
in determining rights to any such benefit or payment ... shall . . . be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof fined not more than $10,000 . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (1982).

183. Id.
184. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 10.
There will be no referral to the U.S. Attorney if the allowability of a cost report
item or items have [sic] been or are [sic] being disputed, and the provider clearly
indicates on the subsequent cost report that the items are included, and the reason
for inclusion (i.e., such as to preserve the provider's right to appeal, or other legal
rights.)
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the intermediary of the provider's intent to appeal. However, the
United States Supreme Court in Bethesda properly rejected this
scheme.
The Secretary cannot maintain, on the one hand, that it is of vital
importance to present challenges to the Secretary's regulations in
the first instance to the fiscal intermediary and, on the other, ac
knowledge that a mere cover letter would ... [satisfy the Secre
tary's requirement of presenting challenges to the intermediary]
because the fiscal intermediary lacks authority to rule on the
challenge. ISS

Further, this scheme is inconsistent with section 139500(a),
which sets forth the jurisdictional requirements to obtain Board re
view. 186 Neither the Board's jurisdictional statute nor its jurisdic
tional regulation require a provider to disregard the Secretary's cost
reimbursement regulations as a prerequisite to obtaining review nor
does it require intermediary notice of the provider's intent to ap
peal.1 87 Although this scheme is inconsistent with section 139500(a)
and the anti-fraud provision, courts, prior to Bethesda, had been en
couraging providers to use it to obtain Board review. 188
Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 332 (quoting Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manuals 2425.1
(HIM-IS». Although Athens II and Saint Luke's cite the Provider Reimbursement Man
ual for this policy provision, the policy is not written anywhere in the manual. Telephone
Interview with Arthur Owens, Member of the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
(Sept. 24, 1987).
185. Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1260.
186. See supra note 29.
187. Id.
188. See Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435,
1466, (11th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988) (Edmondson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 1405, 1410 n.7
(11th Cir. 1987); Baptist Hosp. East v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 860,
865-66 (6th Cir. 1986); Athens II, 743 F.2d at 10.
At the conclusion of the Athens II analysis of the predicted adverse consequences, the
court stated: "[W]here the statute is unclear . . . we should not construe the statute in a
way that would invalidate a series of regulations promulgated by the agency charged with
administering that statute." Athens 11,743 F.2d at 8. As a general proposition, thi~ state
ment is correct. Chevron U.S.A., Inc, v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). However, the court misapplied this proposition in this context.
The Supreme Court in Chevron stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the stat
ute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Id. at 843-44 (footnote omitted). The Secretary did not promulgate a regulation that
clearly defined the Board's jurisdictional authority but instead used the same broad and
ambiguous language that is set forth in the statute. The District of Columbia Circuit Court
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Therefore, permitting the Board to have jurisdiction over provid
ers' totally omitted or mistakenly self-disallowed claims probably
would result in the elimination of a tier of review and would eviscerate
the finality provision concerning the reopening regulations suggested
by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens II.
However, these "adverse practical consequences" will not result if the
Board's jurisdiction is limited to self-disallowed claims.
As a matter of statutory construction, practical effect, and policy,
the proper interpretation of the Board's governing statute should rec
ognize that the scope of the Board's jurisdiction turns on the nature of
the claim presented for review. The proper interpretation of the
Board's jurisdictional scope should adhere to the Bethesda Court's
concern over the futility of presenting a regulatory challenge to the
intermediary as well as the "adverse practical consequences" predicted
in Athens II.

of Appeals used various interrelated regulations and policies as a means to define the
Board's jurisdictional authority.
In Chevron, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated an interpreta
tive regulation defining the statutory term "stationary source." The respondents contended
that the regulation defining "source" was contrary to the legislative history, language, and
purposes of the Clean Air Act. The controversy over the proper definition of "source"
focused on two competing policy concerns: the allowance of economic growth and the .
desire to curtail air pollution. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views ... [is] not [a] judicial one[ ]." Id. at 866. Thus, the Court held that the agency's
"interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests
and is entitled to deference." Id. at 865.
Similarly, there are two specific competing policy considerations governing the proper
statutory interpretation of the Board's governing authority. The policy concern of the
agency is that if self-disa11owed providers are allowed Board jurisdiction, then providers
will be able to appeal all claims not initially presented to the intermediary, thus avoiding a
level of review. The competing policy concern is the providers' right to judicial review of
agency regulations and policies. However, in contrast to the interpretive regulation
promulgated by the EPA in Chevron, the Secretary did not promulgate a regulation that
articulated its policy choice to which a court could defer.
Unlike Chevron, where the Court found the legislative history unilluminating, the leg
islative history of subsection (f) clearly shows Congress' intent to allow providers with self- .
disallowed claims a right to judicial review. See supra note 107. Therefore, Congress did
not explicitly give the Secretary a choice between the competing policy considerations. "If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-43. Thus, even if the agency created a regulation which articulated its policy
choice, the courts should not defer to it. Regardless of the clarity of the Secretary's regula
tion defining the Board's jurisdictional scope, deference to the Secretary's policy choice
would be inappropriate in this circumstance because the choice is "manifestly contrary. to
the statute." Id. at 844.
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C. Adams House: Defining the Proper Limits of the Board's
Jurisdictional Authority
The Court's analysis and interpretation of the Board's governing
statute based on the plain-meaning rule in Bethesda is inadequate to
resolve the controversy over the proper interpretation of the Board's
jurisdictional scope. The Supreme Court should have endorsed the
Adams House interpretation which best effectuates the policy concerns
expressed in Bethesda and Athens II. Similar to the holding in
Bethesda, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Adams House, held
that the Board has jurisdiction over providers' self-disallowed claims
that challenge the Secretary's regulations. In its reasoning, the court
rejected the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' restrictive
interpretation of the Board's governing statute developed in Athens II.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams House correctly
analyzed the two relevant subsections of the Board's governing statute
and presented the most reasonable interpretation of the Board's juris
dictional authority. In construing the subsection (a) requirement that
a provider can appeal to the Board only if it is "dissatisfied with a final
determination," the court in Adams House, like the Supreme Court in
Bethesda, stated that a provider need only be dissatisfied with the total
amount of program reimbursement to appeal to the Board. 189
•
The relevant language of subsection (d) of section 139500 con
cerns the Board's authority over intermediary decisions on "matters
covered by such cost report."I90 Adams House gives this provision a
broad but practical interpretation. The court interpreted "matters
covered by such cost report" to include all costs presented in a cost
report, even those not claimed for reimbursement. 191 This interpreta
tion of subsection (d) recognizes an intermediary's detailed auditing
process of a cost report. An annual cost report consists of hundreds of
pages of cost information. 192 The report is divided into schedules and
work sheets including reimbursable and self-disallowed claims. An in
termediary'S auditing process entails reviewing the computation of re
imbursable costs, which at times necessitates identification of
nonreimbursable items. 193 Nonreimbursable items are included in
189. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 592; Bethesda, 108 S. Ct. at 1258. See supra text
accompanying note 122.
190. See supra text accompanying note 30.
191. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 591. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
192. See Saint Luke's, 810 F.2d at 326.
193. For example, in Saint Luke's, the provider initially recorded sick leave costs
under the broader category of general and administrative costs, for which reimbursement
was claimed. Several pages later, it made an adjustment on Work Sheet A-8 which re
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larger categories of costs such as general and administrative costs.
However, in order to tally reimbursable costs, the nonreimbursable
costs are deducted and recorded on separate work sheets. Adams
House correctly interprets "matters covered by such cost report" be
cause the court recognizes that a complete cost report includes reim
bursable as well as self-disallowed claims which the intermediary must
review.
Both the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Athens
II and the Supreme Court in Bethesda disregarded the intermediary's
detailed aUditing process. In Athens II, the court interpreted "matters
covered by such cost report" to mean only costs claimed for reim
bursement. By applying a restrictive interpretation to this provision,
the court denied the Board jurisdiction to review providers' self-disal
lowed claims. The Supreme Court in Bethesda broadly interpreted
subsection (d) to include costs incurred within the period for which
the report was filed whether or not the claim was reported in the cost
report. This interpretation, in essence, endorses the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' interpretation in Saint Mary, which permitted the
Board to exercise original jurisdiction over mistakenly self-disallowed
as well as totally omitted claims. 194 As the court in Athens II noted,
this exercise of jurisdiction would eliminate the intermediary's factual
findings concerning whether such claims are reimbursable and thereby
eliminates a necessary tier of review. Although broad, the Adams
House interpretation of subsection (d) still requires that self-disallowed
claims be recorded in the provider's cost report and be presented to
the intermediary as a necessary requirement for Board review, thus
retaining the tier of review.
Adams House correctly rejected the First Circuit Court of Ap
peals' statutory interpretation, in Saint Luke's, of subsection (a) and
(d) of the Board's jurisdictional statute. In Saint Luke's, the court
held that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over self-disallowed
claims is discretionary. Adams House construed the operative lan
guage in the statute to mean that the Board must exercise jurisdiction
over self-disallowed claims. Adams House construed the word "shall,"
in subsection (d), as referring to the Board's options once an appeal is
filed, and not to the Board's decision-making authority to hear ap
peals. 19S Furthermore, subsection (a) states that "[a]ny provider of
moved the sick leave costs from the general and administrative category, thereby self-disal
lowing the cost. Id. at 327.
194. See supra text accompanying note 128.
195. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 594. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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services which has filed a required cost report within the time specified
in regulations may obtain a hearing with respect to such cost re!
port...."196 The court construed "may" in this provision to "con
note[] not contingency but entitlement."197 Likewise, the Supreme
Court's plain meaning approach in Bethesda implicitly rejected the
First Circuit Court of Appeals discretionary approach.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation is consistent
.with sound policy and congressional intent because it allows providers
to judicially challenge the validity of the Secretary's regulations and
policies that prohibit reimbursement. 198 The Adams House court's in
terpretation of the Board's governing statute allows providers to chal
lenge these regulations before an independent tribunal.1 99 Although
the Supreme Court's analysis in Bethesda allows providers with self
disallowed claims the right to judicial review, it failed to discuss the
importance of judicial review of agency regulations.
Judicial review of an agency's actions is a crucial component in
the administrative process because it ensures "that unelected agency
decision-makers follow statutory standards and implement delegated
196. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a) (1982) (emphasis added). See supra note 29.
197. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 594.
198. However, in 1983, when the provider reimbursement procedure changed from a
reasonable cost basis to a prospective payment system, see supra note 17, providers were
denied reimbursement for attorneys' fees. This denial of reimbursement reduces providers'
incentive to challenge the Secretary's regulations because, in many cases, the costs of attor
ney fees outweigh the costs at stake. Interview with John Roemer, Vice President of Fi
nance at Franklin Medical Center, in Greenfield, Massachusetts (Nov. 7, 1987).
199. "Our desire to have courts review administrative actions arises from the historic
principle of the 'supremacy of law' or 'rule of law' as it is called. We want an independent
assessment by the court to see that the agency has stayed within the bounds authorized by
the legislature." Coffman, Judicial Review 0/ Administrative Interpretations 0/ Statutes 6
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983). As one noted scholar states:
From the point of view of an agency, the question of the legitimacy of its action is '
secondary to that of the positive solution of a problem. It is for this reason that
we, in common with nearly all the Western countries, have concluded that the
maintenance of legitimacy requires a judicial body independent of the active
administration.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE ACTION 323 (\965). In a colorful
analogy, Professor Jaffe states:
An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the
magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination of the agency to judicial
jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought
into harmony with the totality of the law; the law as it is found in the statute at
hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the "common
law," and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.
Id. at 327.
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,authority in a rational manner."200 The Athens II approach, however,

insulates the Secretary's rulemaking authority from judicial scrutiny
and gives providers no recourse to challenge the agency's regulations
and policy provisions. As Tallahassee demonstrated,201 Congress in

200. Connelly, CongreSSional Authority to Expand the Class ofPersons With Standing
to Seek Judicial Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 139, 139 (1987).
The scope of judicial review of the agency's regulations is defined in subsection (f).
This section provides that an action filed in a district court "shall be tried pursuant to the
applicable provisions under chapter 7 of title 5...." 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(I) (1982). The
applicable provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which governs the scope
of a court's review of an agency's regulation is § 706. This section provides that a review
ing court can reverse or sustain an agency's regulation under an "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" standard of review. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1982).
[T]he court reviews the agency's justification of its decision to determine whether
the decision is rational and not contrary to the available evidence and takes into
account what should be considered. If, given what the agency should consider,
the explanation demonstrates a reasonable connection between the evidence and
the choice made, the action is sustained.
S. CHILDRESS & M. DAVIS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES & ADMINISTRATIVE ApPEALS
§ 15.7, at 290 (1986). It is necessary for the court to know the basis of the agency's deci
sion before it can reverse or sustain an agency's action. "[I]ts action must be judged by the
standards which the [agency] itself invoked." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89
(1943). An agency's regulation will be held to be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explana
tion for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc., v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29,43 (1983). Courts also inquiry into whether the Secretary has acted within the
scope of his or her authority and whether the Secretary has followed the necessary proce
dures set out in the APA. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971). In Lloyd Noland Hosp. and Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985), the
court held that the 1979 Medical Malpractice regulation was arbitrary and capricious be
cause it failed to show a proper basis for its decision and that the Secretary violated the
requirement of proper notice (5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982» and failed to incorporate in the
regulation a general statement of its basis and purpose (5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982».
However, when reviewing the validity of a regulation, courts will sometimes defer to
the Secretary. In Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981), the Court reviewed a
Medicaid regulation which permits states to determine eligibility by including a spouse's
income as income "available" to the applicant. The Court stated that "the Secretary's
definition of the term 'available' is 'entitled to more than mere deference or weight'....
Rather, the Secretary's definition is entitled to 'legislative effect' because, '[i]n a situation of
this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary respon
sibility for interpreting the statutory term.''' Id. at 44 (citations omitted). But see Saint '
James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[A] lesser degree of defer
ence is required when reviewing the Secretary's actions under the Medicare Act's reim
bursement provisions."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
201. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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tended that providers have the right to judicial review. 202 Similarly,
the Bethesda approach is incorrect because it disregards congressional
intent to limit Board review to self-disallowed claims challenging the
Secretary's regulations, and it disregards policy considerations and the
practical aspects of the reimbursement process.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court in Bethesda presented an ex
pansive interpretation to the Board's governing statute. The Court re
jected the Athens II restrictive approach by permitting the Board to
review claims not initially presented to the intermediary. Similarly,
the Court rejected the First Circuit Court of Appeals' approach which
gives the Board discretion to review claims presented on appeal. How
ever, Bethesda essentially has endorsed the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' interpretation that requires the Board to review all claims
presented. The four United States Courts of Appeals that have ex
plored the array of possible interpretations all have rejected this ex
pansive view because it disregards the restrictive language of the
statute, congressional intent, and policy considerations. As Judge
Bork stated in his analysis of the "practical adverse consequences" in
Athens II, this expansive interpretation of the Board's jurisdictional
scope will eliminate a tier of review and "eviscerate" the finality provi
sion concerning reopening regulations. This broad interpretation
overreaches the Board's jurisdictional limitations which Congress ex
plicitly defined in the statute.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals offers the most reasonable
and practical approach to the Board's governing statute. Adams
House presents an interpretation that best effectuates the Medicare re
imbursement process and Congress' intent to provide judicial review
of agency regulations. An analysis of the intricacies of the reimburse
ment process, statutory construction, legislative history, case law, and
policy shows why the proper interpretation to the Board's governing
statute is the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' approach in Adams
House.

Kathleen A. Carrigan
202. Although the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Tallahassee empha
sized the right to judicial review, it does not provide the necessary statutory interpretation
to the Board's governing statute to give effect to that right. The court failed to explain
whether a provider with a self-disallowed claim satisfies the jurisdictional requirements in
subsection (a). Subsection (a) and (d) should be interpreted to allow providers to exercise
the general grant of judicial review stated in subsection (f).

